using cyber weapons trigger the requirements of the War Powers Resolution? 9 Would OCOs be subject to reporting requirements under the Intelligence Authorization Act? 10 Conversely, do cyber operations grant the executive branch another tool with which it can prosecute attacks but avoid reporting and responding to congressional inquiries? These questions are largely unanswered both because the rise of OCOs is a relatively recent phenomenon and because much of the information about U.S. technical capability in this field is highly classified.
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Yet addressing these questions is increasingly important for two reasons. First, as states such as China, Israel, Russia, and the United States use these weapons now and likely will do so more in future conflicts, determining the domestic legal strictures governing their use would provide policymakers and military planners a better sense of how to operate in cyberspace. 12 Second, the possible employment of these tools adds yet another wrinkle to the battle between the executive and legislative branches over war-making authority. 13 In particular, if neither the War Powers Resolution nor the Intelligence Authorization Act governs OCOs, the executive may be allowed to employ U.S. military power in a manner largely unchecked by congressional authority.
14 As a result, the employment of these tools Alexander%2004-15-10.pdf [hereinafter Advance Questions] ("President Obama's cybersecurity sixty-day study highlighted the mismatch between our technical capabilities to conduct operations and the governing laws and policies, and our civilian leadership is working hard to resolve the mismatch."); Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon is debating cyberattacks, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2010, at A1 [hereinafter Nakashima, Pentagon is debating cyberattacks] (discussing the so-far-unsuccessful attempts to establish a coherent legal framework governing offensive cyber operations). 
12
See infra Part I.
13
See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 14 For example, if, in the case of Operation Odyssey Dawn, the United States had decided to use cyberattacks to disable Libyan air defense systems, such an attack may not have triggered the reporting and removal requirements explicit in the War Powers Resolution. See infra Part IV. Though the Obama Administration argued that its military activities in Libya did not constitute hostilities for the purposes of the War Powers Resolution-and therefore did not trigger its reporting requirements-if U.S. forces were actively engaged in combat for a longer period of time such that the activities did constitute hostilities, determining whether cyberattacks trigger the War Powers clock would become critical in establishing when the executive was required to report and remove troops absent implicates-and perhaps problematically shifts-the balance between the executive's commander-in-chief power 15 and Congress's war-making authority. 16 This Comment provides an initial answer to the question of whether current U.S. law can effectively govern the Executive's use of OCOs. 17 It explores the interaction between this new tool and the current statutory limits on presidential war-making authority, with a particular focus on whether the two current federal laws meant to restrict executive power in this field-the War Powers Resolution 18 and the Intelligence Authorization Act 19 -apply to a wide range of potential offensive cyber operations undertaken by the executive branch. Beyond suggesting that neither the War Powers Resolution nor the Intelligence Authorization Act can effectively regulate most types of offensive cyber operations, this Comment suggests that while marginally problematic for a proper balance of war-making power between the executive and legislative branches, this lack of oversight does not fundamentally shift the current alignment. It does argue, however, that-given this lack of regulatory oversight-the President now has another powerful war-making tool to use at his discretion. Finally, the Comment suggests that this lack of limitation may be positive in some ways, as laying down clear legal markers before having a developed understanding of these capabilities may problematically limit their effective use.
This Comment proceeds by addressing these issues in five sections. Part I introduces the recent increase in offensive cyber operations and capabilities, both by the United States and other countries. It also discusses the underdeveloped nature of the law governing OCOs in the United States. Part II provides an overview of offensive cyber operations, specifically laying out a spectrum upon which different operations would fall (i.e., as stand- alone operations or as a tactical supplement to major combat operations). Establishing this spectrum facilitates categorization of cyber operations and helps determine which domestic statutory framework would govern a particular type of operation.
Part III examines cyber operations through the prism of the War Powers Resolution, noting that while the Resolution is likely constitutional, an analysis of its language, Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") opinions interpreting it, and case law suggests that it does not cover the use of offensive cyberattacks even if used as part of major military campaigns. Part IV examines whether the Intelligence Authorization Act provides Congress with regulatory power over stand-alone and covert operations, suggesting that, given its weak information-sharing requirements and substantially malleable language, the Act does not provide Congress with an effective regulatory mechanism. Part V discusses the implications of this lack of federal statutory coverage, in particular suggesting both that these new types of capabilities do not represent a substantial shift in the balance of warmaking authority between the executive and the legislative branches and that, while critics lament the fact that it does not rein in presidential actions, the conclusion that it should is premature.
I. DEVELOPING OFFENSIVE CYBER CAPABILITIES, UNDER-DEVELOPING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
Over the past five years, offensive cyber operations have become an increasingly frequent element of, inter alia, major combat operations, 20 coercive diplomacy, 21 and attempts to prevent nuclear proliferation. During this period, they have received a great deal of attention as newly effective methods of waging war, and indeed the United States, concerned both with developing defensive measures against enemies employing these capabilities, as well as determining how it will use its own offensive capabilities, has begun organizing around the notion that offensive cyber operations will constitute an important component of future warfare. 23 Yet during this time frame, despite the development and consideration of the employment of these capabilities, U.S. policymakers have been unable to effectively develop a legal framework for when they can and cannot be used. 24 The following discussion details some of the most notable public instances of the employment of offensive cyber operations over the past halfdecade. It also describes how many policymakers and military strategists believe that cyber operations will become even more important in future combat operations.
It then proceeds to discuss the comparatively underdeveloped legal rules and regulations governing the United States' use of such weapons.
A. Cyber Warfare Outside the U.S. Context
In what some journalists called the "world's first cyberwar," hackers linked to the Russian government attacked Estonian government websites and infrastructure in April and May of 2007. 25 In a series of attacks lasting approximately one month, Russian-linked hackers, responding to the removal of a Soviet statue in a port city, "came close to shutting down the country's digital infrastructure, clogging the Web sites of the president, the prime minister, Parliament and other government agencies, staggering Estonia's biggest bank and overwhelming the sites of several daily newspapers." 26 The attackers used a network of "bots"-computers slaved to master servers and spread as widely as the United States and Vietnam-to overload Estonia's networks and shut down its ability to process information. 27 These Denial of Service ("DoS") and Distributed Denial of Service ("DDoS") attacks had a substantial effect on Estonia that went beyond making it impossible for Internet users to browse government websites; by attacking bank sites, the hackers were able to shut down online services and cause significant losses for financial firms.
28
Though Russia denied any link to the hackers, many in the cyber community-as well as in Estonia-believed the Russian government was responsible. 29 The incident raised two primary points of concern among national security officials and analysts around the world. First, though cyberattacks to steal information have been occurring for a long time (popularly dubbed "cyber exploitation"), 30 many thought this episode represented the first time a nation had employed a large-scale cyberattack to disable or destroy another country's infrastructure. 31 Second, compared to many other nations, experts considered Estonia to be particularly well prepared to deal with cyberattacks, as the government had teams and plans in place that actively confronted each intrusion throughout the episode. 32 However, the Estonian attacks represented only one type of OCO undertaken in the past five years and likely the least damaging to the intended target. 33 In that case, though hackers were able to disrupt financial and cyber operations will become standard operating protocol in future military operations.
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In addition, the Israelis reportedly linked their cyber and kinetic operations-and plan to do so in the future-in conflicts against regional adversaries. In 2007, the Israelis launched Operation Orchard, a strike against a purported nuclear reactor being built in Syria with North Korean help. 40 Israeli aircraft penetrated Syrian airspace without detection or attack from Syria's air defense network. 41 Analysts believe that the Israelis were able to slip into Syrian airspace with non-stealthy aircraft due to a cyberattack-perhaps in the form of a kill switch that Israeli saboteurs placed inside electronics delivered to Syria-that disabled the air defense network. 42 Given the success of this operation, and particularly the fact that no Israeli aircraft were lost, many analysts believe that the Israelis will use a similar strategy if they decide to attack Iranian nuclear facilities. Over the past decade, the United States has begun to devote an increasing amount of attention to defending against offensive cyber operations while developing its own offensive capabilities.
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In 2009, the United States set up Cyber Command ("CYBERCOM"), co-housed with the National Security Agency, to help secure U.S. systems from cyberattack.
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While initially billed as a way to better streamline the United States' ability to defend itself against cyber operations, it quickly became apparent that a major mission of the new command was to develop and deploy offensive cyber weaponry across the globe. Indeed, General Keith Alexander, the chief of Cyber Command and the director of the National Security Agency, has expressed a desire to have National Defense Authorization Act, the Department of Defense did not directly address-at least in an unclassified forum-the extent of U.S. offensive cyber capabilities, nor the policies governing them. 57 However, it did reference that these capabilities exist: " [T] he Department has the capability to conduct offensive operations. . . . DoD will conduct offensive cyber operations in a manner consistent with the policy principles and legal regimes that the Department follows for kinetic capabilities, including the law of armed conflict." 58 These limited references to offensive cyber operations, including how existing legal principles may govern them, are becoming more frequent in public discussions, however. For example, in its Cyberspace Policy Report, the Department of Defense indirectly alluded to such capabilities by briefly touching on the application of the War Powers Resolution to cyberspace: "Cyber operations might not include the introduction of armed forces personnel into the area of hostilities. Cyber operations may, however, be a component of larger operations that could trigger notification and reporting in accordance with the War Powers Resolution."
59
Though not discussing specific U.S. policies or capabilities, such statements echo the idea-explored above in the Russian, Israeli, and Chinese cases-that the United States is actively planning to utilize cyber operations in future conflicts. And in one of the most transparent discussions of U.S. OCOs to date, General Alexander appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2010 and answered questions about CYBERCOM's mission, including its offensive activities.
60
In response to advance questions by senators, he noted that CYBERCOM would serve "as the focal point for deconfliction of DOD offensive cyberspace operations." 61 More recently, in the 2012 House Conference Report for the National Defense Authorization Act, Congress specifically recognized U.S. offensive cyber capabilities:
Congress affirms that the Department of Defense has the capability, and upon direction by the President may conduct offensive operations in cyberspace to defend our Nation, Allies and interests, subject to (1) the policy principles and legal regimes that the Department follows for kinetic capabilities, including the law of armed conflict; and (2) the War Powers Resolution. . . . 62 57 DEP'T OF DEF. CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT, supra note 11, at 2-9.
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Id. at 5.
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Id. at 9.
60
Advance Questions, supra note 8 (suggesting that the United States is developing, and will deploy, greater offensive cyber capabilities in the future).
61
Id. at 1. Further, as discussed, in the recent Libyan intervention, the Obama administration has actively considered using its offensive cyber capabilities in conjunction with kinetic operations.
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The instances above suggest that many countries-the United States among them-are developing and deploying offensive cyber capabilities both as tools of deterrence and for war-fighting purposes. Further, these comments and documents suggest that in the United States, policymakers are beginning to grapple with how these new technologies may fall under current legal regimes and potentially alter the war-making balance between Congress and the President.
C. The United States, Offensive Cyber Capabilities, and Legal Gaps
While a large body of scholarship speaks to the question of whetherand how-international law governs the use of cyber weapons, few scholars have addressed the issue of whether U.S. domestic law provides guidance as to when and how these tools can be employed and whether Congress currently has the ability to effectively regulate their use. Since the late 1990s, scholars and practitioners have grappled with a number of issues related to whether cyberattacks constitute armed attacks, justify self-defense, or create national obligations to assist other countries under cyberattack.
64
In particular, international law scholars have considered whether offensive cyberattacks constitute the use of armed force under the UN Charter. 65 They have suggested that such conclusions should be determined by the damage inflicted. 66 Other scholars have looked to past instances of actions short of the use of kinetic force, such as economic sanctions, to argue that cyberattacks likely constitute acts of aggression. 67 Likewise, academics, pursuant to the same policy, principles, and legal regimes that pertain to kinetic capabilities."). examining similar questions, have asserted either that international law cannot-as currently understood-effectively deal with these issues, or that, for the foreseeable future, such questions will not be clarified. 68 Others have explored when cyberattacks can justify legitimate acts of self-defense. 69 Beyond the academy, policymakers have also actively discussed whether and how international law governs the use of offensive cyber operations. 70 While many in the public sphere have paid a great deal of attention to the legality of offensive cyber operations, far less attention has been devoted to how domestic law interacts with the United States' employment of these capabilities. Indeed, policymakers have repeatedly noted "the mismatch between our technical capabilities to conduct operations and the governing laws and policies." 71 Over the past few years, studies have suggested that the United States has not developed such a legal framework and that whether current U.S. law-such as the War Powers Resolution-can regulate OCOs remains under-analyzed. 72 While some argue that attempting to develop such a framework will severely hamper the United States' ability to effectively conduct offensive cyber operations in future conflicts, 73 most analysts agree that "[t]oday's policy and legal framework for guiding and regulating the U.S. use of cyberattack is ill-formed, undeveloped, and highly uncertain."
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To this point, most of the debate as to the legality of these operations has remained behind government doors. 75 Indeed, until very recently, scholars damaging as cyberattacks and merely represent a cessation of trade with a target country, not an active attack on that country's infrastructure). This lack of attention creates a series of problems in determining whether and how to regulate these operations. Most notably, before even addressing whether a new framework should be developed, the question arises as to whether the current domestic legal framework can govern the employment of these capabilities. Although many policymakers have suggested the current framework cannot govern OCOs, this question remains to be closely examined and argued. Only if the existing framework is found inadequate should legal scholars and practitioners design a new legal framework. Indeed, if, as Matthew Waxman argues, "strategy is a . . . driver of legal evolution,"
79 then new legal mechanisms may be required to ensure proper limitations on the executive's war-making abilities.
Though a full accounting of the potential domestic legal mechanisms governing the use of offensive cyber weapons is beyond the scope of this Comment, a first step in determining whether the current legal framework can be effective, at least partially, in governing the uses of these new weapons is to examine whether an appropriate procedural system exists as to regulate when and how they are employed. Though not delving into specifics about the use of these weapons, an operative, procedural framework that allows other governmental branches to review, understand, and potentially check the uses of these weapons provides an initial move towards their effective regulation. Though it may not be sufficient to fully clarify when and how the use of offensive cyber weapons may be legal, such a system at least would allow for oversight and hold the promise of helping policymakers better understand the conditions under which they can lawfully use these tools. To this end, this Comment examines the two primary statutory tools through which Congress has tried to regulate executive military action: the War Powers Resolution and the Intelligence Authorization Act. There are two reasons to focus on these statutes. First, they apply to instances in which offensive cyber weapons will most likely be employed outside of surveillance and espionage actions: covert actions to disable and disrupt adversary systems and capabilities, and overt actions taken in conjunction with kinetic operations to degrade an adversary's ability to effectively conduct combat operations. Second, they are the primary means through which Congress has attempted to constrain the President's exercise of his constitutional Commander-in-Chief function. 80 Historically, and particularly since 1970, Congress has been reluctant to use its primary power, the power of the purse, to defund military activities, utilizing it only a handful of times. 81 As recent controversies over funding for wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the intervention in Libya illustrate, threatening to defund ongoing military operations is politically delicate and many legislators prefer to avoid taking such action.
82
Before proceeding to analyze OCOs through the prism of these two statutes, however, sharpening our understanding of the different types of OCOs is necessary.
II. TYPOLOGIES, EMPLOYMENT, AND OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS
Cyberattacks are "efforts to alter, disrupt, or destroy computer systems or networks or the information or programs on them . . . [,] encompassing activities that range in target (military versus civilian, public versus private), consequences (minor versus major, direct versus indirect), and duration (temporary versus long-term)." guidance as to what may constitute a cyberattack, for the purposes of applying existing legal structures, the definition must be conceptualized in a way that usefully fits into those preexisting regimes. Because of the complexity and great number of potential means of cyberattack, this Comment groups such attacks based on employment, i.e., the way in which they are utilized and their intended purposes. Such an approach provides greater clarity as to which U.S. domestic legal regime will likely govern their employment. The following section proceeds by first discussing some of the technical details of cyberattacks and then moves into understanding how they have been-and likely will be-employed in future conflicts.
Before moving to a discussion of what cyberattacks are, it is important to note what they are not. They are not cyberexploitation, that is, "the use of actions and operations . . . to obtain information that would otherwise be kept confidential . . . . Cyberexploitations are usually clandestine and conducted with the smallest possible intervention that still allows extraction of the information sought." 84 The core difference between attack and exploitation is in the cyber operation's purpose; cyberattacks are meant to be destructive whereas cyberexploitation acquires information nondestructively. 85 While the term offensive cyber operations usually encompasses both attack and exploitative elements, here "OCO" refers only to attacks. 86 At the most basic level, a cyberattack requires three elements: vulnerability; access; and payload. 87 A vulnerability is "an aspect of the system that can be used by the attacker to compromise" an adversary's network. 88 Given the increase in the number of complex systems employed by countries in the past two decades, many cyber defense analysts and computer experts agree that it is increasingly difficult to foresee and prevent vulnerability exploitation before attacks.
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Access refers to the ability to deliver the payload into the target system such that it exploits the vulnerability. In particular, access to a target depends on whether the attack can be launched via remote access (e.g., by hacking into a computer network via the internet) 90 or close access (e.g., attacking a system through extended period of time-to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy adversary computer systems or networks or the information and (or) programs resident in or transiting these systems or networks.").
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Lin, supra note 83, at 63.
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See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 70, at 83 (giving a technical account of the technology and operational considerations underpinning contemporary cyber-weapons).
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the "local installation of hardware" via covert operatives).
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The payload describes "the things that can be done once a vulnerability has been exploited. For example, once a software agent (such as a virus) has entered a given computer, it can be programmed to do many things-reproducing and retransmitting itself, destroying files on the system, or altering files." 92 Cyberattacks generally target a system's integrity (i.e., the system's ability to operate normally), 93 ability to discern proper authenticity (i.e., the system's ability to determine whether it should accept incoming data), 94 or its availability (i.e., whether users can properly access the system). 95 The resulting effects can be wide-ranging, including destroying data on networks, generating bogus network traffic, covertly altering data on the network, and degrading or denying service on the network. 96 Depending on whether the systems being attacked are remote or close access, a number of assault avenues exist. In an attack on a remote access system, botnets are one of the prominent means of assault.
97
In a botnet attack, which usually aims to deny users access to the system (such as a government website in a denial of service or distributed denial of service attack), bots install themselves on internet-connected computers and then, responding to commands from a master computer, attack the target by overloading it with numerous requests for information, such as e-mails, sometimes numbering in the millions. 98 Because the target cannot sufficiently process the information, it becomes inoperative. 99 Other ways to attack remote access systems include worms and viruses, which are generally used to install "trojan horse" systems on many computers that will render those computers inoperable.
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Attacking close access systems may generally be more difficult given their lower degree of accessibility. However, one attack approach involves inserting malicious software into the supply chain of a system that will eventually become close access.
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Such a strategy allows a compromised 91 Id.
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Id. at 88.
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Id. at 111.
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Id. at 112. machine or piece of software to enter into the close access system and then to be activated at a later point based on a variety of triggering mechanisms. Other attack routes include inserting compromised universal serial buses ("USBs") into close systems. Such an approach can be accomplished either by willing or unwilling insiders. 102 Hypothetically, scholars and practitioners have postulated a number of ways in which states might use cyberattacks in future combat scenarios, depending on a wide range of factors. 103 This process of categorization is not novel, as U.S. military planners have attempted to produce useful typologies since the mid-1990s. 104 While many potential categorization schemas exist, and many involve different types of adversaries, vulnerabilities, technologies underpinning the attacks, etc., most seem to focus on a primary element: the relationship of the cyberattack to other operations. In particular, the schemas differentiate based on whether the attack is part of a larger, kinetic offensive, or simply an attack launched independently of such operations. For example, Gregory Rattray and Jason Healey, in their recent work, suggest multiple ways in which a state could launch such an attack, but underpinning each is a discussion of whether the attack is part of a larger military operation or conducted independently.
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available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA486949.pdf ("Net-Centric systems surely will attract sophisticated adversaries who can subvert the supply chain to replace or alter software or hardware, recruiting well-placed insiders and exploiting single-string dependencies.").
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Steve Stasiukonis, Social Engineering, the USB Way, DARK READING (June 7, 2006, 4:15 AM), http://www.darkreading.com/security/news/208803634/social-engineering-the-uscway.html (detailing a social engineering experiment where a cyber expert scattered compromised USB drives throughout a parking lot, believing that bank employees would use them in the bank's close system and consequently give him access. Over 75% of the USBs placed in the parking lot were inserted into the bank's computers). 
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Given the historical record of cyberattacks and that most of the theoretical literature categorizes such attacks based on their relationship to military actions, this Comment divides the attacks into binary categories: attacks waged independently of other military operations, and attacks waged as part of a larger military campaign. Though such a distinction may blur as states employ their capabilities in innovative ways, relying on that distinction now will aid both in understanding how different U.S. domestic laws apply to both general categories and in better preparing legal analysts in case of future cyber operations that do not neatly fit into them. Given this distinction, the analysis below examines whether current U.S. law effectively governs offensive cyber operations performed in conjunction with a military campaign or as a stand-alone operation.
III. THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: ARMED FORCES, HOSTILITIES, AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Before proceeding to a discussion of either the War Powers Resolution or the Intelligence Authorization Act, one must acknowledge the inherent tension built into the relationship between Congress and the President over the power to wage war. Notably, the Constitution splits war-making authorities between the congressional and executive branches.
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Proponents of executive power suggest that, because the President is the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States," 117 he is vested with the war-making power to determine when and how to deploy U.S. armed forces. 118 Conversely, Congress has the ability to "declare war," "raise and support Armies," "provide and maintain a Navy," and "provide for calling forth" and organizing and arming the militia. 119 Further, based on the Necessary and Proper Clause, some argue that Congress is empowered to pass legislation in accordance with its constitutional war-making authority specified above. 120 The debate over the extent of each branch's war-making WPR under most circumstances, 131 and the likelihood that deploying offensive cyber activities does not constitute the introduction of armed forces into hostilities (if the hostilities threshold is even met), 132 the War Powers Resolution is a weak footing upon which to base congressional oversight of these activities.
The following section provides an overview of the provisions of the War Powers Resolution, paying particular attention to its reporting and withdrawal requirements. It then proceeds to discuss the debates over the Resolution's effectiveness and constitutionality, noting that while it has proven ineffective at times, it may not be fatally flawed or unconstitutional. Following, this section discusses the definitions of key terms, based both on how they have been interpreted in past historical instances of the Resolution's invocation and in the legislative history of the Act. Finally, this section argues that its terms likely do not cover offensive cyber operations launched independently or in conjunction with kinetic operations.
A. A Brief Overview of the War Powers Resolution
In the absence of congressional declaration of war, the WPR requires that:
[T]he President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, setting forth-(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces; (B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and (C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.
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Three circumstances trigger this reporting requirement. If United States armed forces are introduced: (1) "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;" 134 (2) if such forces are introduced "into the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces;" 135 and (3) "in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a 
134
135
foreign nation." 136 Beyond requiring the President to submit a report to Congress within forty-eight hours of these specific triggering events, the WPR also directs the President to withdraw armed forces within sixty days after the report is submitted or is required to be submitted, unless Congress has declared war, extended the sixty-day period by law, or is physically unable to meet because of an armed attack against the United States. 137 The President can unilaterally extend this period for an additional thirty days. 138 In another controversial provision of the Act, Congress, by concurrent resolution, can order the President to remove U.S. armed forces if they are engaged in hostilities outside of the United States without a declaration of war or statutory authorization. 139 As discussed below, the constitutionality of this section (as well as the mandatory sixty-day removal requirement) is debatable, as the Supreme Court has ruled that legislative vetoes invalidating executive actions-which these sections arguably constitute-are unconstitutional.
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As becomes evident, based on the text of the Resolution, determining the definitions of "U.S. armed forces," "hostilities," "imminent," and "into the territory . . . while equipped for combat," is crucial for concluding whether the President must report U.S. military activities and remove U.S. forces after sixty days. Before analyzing whether such definitions might encompass offensive cyber operations, it is helpful to understand the primary arguments against the Act, including the routine assertion by Presidents that it is unconstitutional.
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B. The Alleged Weaknesses of the War Powers Resolution
Critics of the War Powers Resolution assert two broad critiques: that it is ineffective in practice and that it is unconstitutional. 142 Regarding the first 
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Id. In particular, administrations continually argue that situations into which U.S. troops are deployed do not constitute hostilities. 144 Likewise, some suggest that macro-scale operations of the kind triggering the War Powers Resolution-where lengthy troop deployments are followed by crises and subsequent war-are antiquated and unlikely to occur in contemporary times. 145 Other analysts simply claim that Presidents have ignored the reporting requirements 146 and that members of Congress have been unwilling to stand up to potentially popular presidential uses of force, even if they clearly violate the WPR. 147 As a result, some analysts believe that other congressional mechanisms, such as its funding powers, provide the body with stronger oversight ability over executive action.
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While many have critiqued the War Powers Resolution for its apparent ineffectiveness, this does not necessarily suggest it is has been futile; Presidents have actively submitted reports pursuant to its requirements and therefore have at least provided Congress with information about their activities. 149 handling the foreign affairs of the nation, and leave the United States drifting helplessly in stormy seas, naked before its enemies"). Chadha decision is generally believed to have struck down section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, which permits the Congress to direct the President to remove the armed from a hostile situation by passage of a concurrent resolution."
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In addition, some argue that Section 5(b) (requiring the removal of troops after the mandatory sixty-day period without congressional action, i.e., if only one chamber of Congress does not act) also represents a legislative veto.
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In Chadha, the Supreme Court ruled that § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which allowed Congress to pass a joint resolution forcing the Attorney General to cancel a deportation, was unconstitutional because it was a legislative veto of executive action. 160 Basing its decision on Article I, Section 7, Clauses 2 and 3 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court concluded that congressional action meant to have the effect of law must be approved by both houses of Congress and presented to the President for his approval (or disapproval). 161 In Chadha, "the Court held that § 244(c)(2) [was] unconstitutional because it authorized one house of Congress to change the legal status quo by action less than that required by the Constitution for a valid law." 162 As noted by Professor Sidney Buchanan however, substantial distinctions exist between § 244(c)(2) and the War Powers Resolution. For example, § 244(c)(2) allowed Congress to change the legal status quo by adjusting the legal status of the immigrant. 163 If, as some scholars argue, the War Powers Resolution is a codification of legally existing congressional war-making authority, then the War Powers Resolution does not change the legal status quo but merely fleshes out these powers. 164 Further, though scholars note that the War Powers Resolution may be unconstitutional because the action (of forcing the removal of troops) is not presented to the President for his approval, such presentment may not be required. 165 In Hollingsworth v. Virginia, the Supreme Court suggested that the presentment requirement applies only to which Congress reserves to itself a power to affect, by later action less than a law, authority that it has previously delegated to some other agency or branch of government, typically to the executive branch or to an administrative agency exercising quasi-legislative, rulemaking authority"). Buchanan, supra note 157, at 1174.
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"ordinary" cases of legislation. 166 This assertion implies that there may exist cases where legislation does not require presentment before the President and it is likely that a concurrent resolution in the War Powers Resolution would be extraordinary enough to fall into such a category. 167 As a result, it is unclear whether the War Powers Resolution represents an impermissible legislative veto.
Third, courts have suggested that members of Congress may have standing to bring suit based on violations of the War Powers Resolution. 168 Federal courts have suggested that, if Congress were to pass a resolution requiring a particular presidential report under the War Powers Resolution, for example, non-compliance with this resolution would constitute a cognizable claim. 169 As a result, Congress could potentially use the courts to bring a successful claim for violation of the War Powers Resolution.
Fourth and finally, some federal courts have asserted that the issue of whether the President refuses to abide by the War Powers Resolution is a political, non-justiciable question, and therefore the courts cannot rule on the matter. 170 At the same time, however, courts have also asserted that if a majority of Congress agreed that the President must abide by the requirements of the War Powers Resolution in a given circumstance, such consensus would present a justiciable claim to the courts.
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As this discussion illustrates, the War Powers Resolution is certainly flawed. However, it is not necessarily unconstitutional and may serve some 166 Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. 378, 381 n.* (1798) ("The negative of the President applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation: He has nothing to do with the proposition, or adoption, of amendments to the Constitution."). ere Congress to pass a resolution to the effect that a report was required under the WPR, or to the effect that the forces should be withdrawn, and the President disregarded it, a constitutional impasse appropriate for judicial resolution would be presented."). positive function by alerting Congress to activities undertaken by the President and giving them the potential opportunity to weigh in, albeit not likely force the removal of U.S. forces. Thus, it still may prove useful in helping Congress regulate the use of offensive cyber operations, if it applies to them.
C. The War Powers Resolution as Applied to Offensive Cyber Operations
As discussed above, critical to the application of the War Powers Resolution-especially in the context of an offensive cyber operation-are the definitions of key terms, particularly "armed forces," as the relevant provisions of the Act are only triggered if the President "introduc[es armed forces] into hostilities or into situations [of] imminent . . . hostilities,"
172 or if such forces are introduced "into the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces."
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The requirements may also be triggered if the United States deploys armed forces "in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation." 174 As is evident, the definition of "armed forces" is crucial to deciphering whether the WPR applies in a particular circumstance to provide congressional leverage over executive actions. The definition of "hostilities," which has garnered the majority of scholarly and political attention, 175 particularly in the recent Libyan conflict, 176 will be dealt with secondarily here because it only becomes important if "armed forces" exist in the situation.
As is evident from a textual analysis, 177 an examination of the legislative history, 178 and the broad policy purposes behind the creation of the Act, 
174
Id. (defining "hostilities" "to mean a situation in which units of the U.S. armed forces are actively engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units of hostile forces . . . .").
176
Libya War Powers, supra note 14, at 7-8.
177
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined . . . on the basis of which meaning is [] most in accord with context and ordinary usage . . . .").
178
United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 226-44 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (illustrating how judges examine legislative history when interpreting statutes).
"armed forces" refers to U.S. soldiers and members of the armed forces, not weapon systems or capabilities such as offensive cyber weapons. Section 1547 does not specifically define "armed forces," but it states that "the term 'introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government."
180
While this definition pertains to the broader phrase "introduction of armed forces," the clear implication is that only members of the armed forces count for the purposes of the definition under the WPR. Though not dispositive, the term "member" connotes a human individual who is part of an organization. 181 Thus, it appears that the term "armed forces" means human members of the United States armed forces. However, there exist two potential complications with this reading. First, the language of the statute states that "the term 'introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces."
182 By using inclusionary-as opposed to exclusionarylanguage, one might argue that the term "armed forces" could include more than members. This argument is unconvincing however, given that a core principle of statutory interpretation, expressio unius, suggests that expression of one thing (i.e., members) implies the exclusion of others (such as nonmembers constituting armed forces). 183 Second, the term "member" does not explicitly reference "humans," and so could arguably refer to individual units and beings that are part of a larger whole (e.g., wolves can be members of a pack). As a result, though a textual analysis suggests that "armed forces" refers to human members of the armed forces, such a conclusion is not determinative.
An examination of the legislative history also suggests that Congress clearly conceptualized "armed forces" as human members of the armed forces. For example, disputes over the term "armed forces" revolved around who could be considered members of the armed forces, not what constituted a member. Senator Thomas Eagleton, one of the Resolution's architects, proposed an amendment during the process providing that the Resolution cover military officers on loan to a civilian agency (such as the Central See, e.g., Member, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/member?s=ts (last visited Oct. 22, 2012) (defining a "member" as a "person . . . that is part of a society, party, community, taxon, or other body"). Intelligence Agency). 184 This amendment was dropped after encountering pushback, 185 but the debate revolved around whether those military individuals on loan to the civilian agency were still members of the armed forces for the purposes of the WPR, suggesting that Congress considered the term to apply only to soldiers in the armed forces. Further, during the congressional hearings, the question of deployment of "armed forces" centered primarily on past U.S. deployment of troops to combat zones, 186 suggesting that Congress conceptualized "armed forces" to mean U.S. combat troops.
The broad purpose of the Resolution aimed to prevent the large-scale but unauthorized deployments of U.S. troops into hostilities.
187
While examining the broad purpose of a legislative act is increasingly relied upon only after examining the text and legislative history, here it provides further support for those two alternate interpretive sources. 188 As one scholar has noted, "[t]he War Powers Resolution, for example, is concerned with sending U.S. troops into harm's way." 189 The historical context of the War Powers Resolution is also important in determining its broad purpose; as the resolutions submitted during the Vietnam War and in the lead-up to the passage of the WPR suggest, Congress was concerned about its ability to effectively regulate the President's deployments of large numbers of U.S. troops to Southeast Asia, 190 as well as prevent the President from authorizing troop incursions into countries in that region. 191 The WPR was a reaction to the President's continued deployments of these troops into combat zones, and as such suggests that Congress's broad purpose was to prevent the unconstrained deployment of U.S. personnel, not weapons, into hostilities.
This analysis suggests that, when defining the term "armed forces," Congress meant members of the armed forces who would be placed in harm's way (i.e., into hostilities or imminent hostilities). Applied to offensive cyber operations, such a definition leads to the conclusion that the War Powers Resolution likely does not cover such activities. Worms, viruses, and kill switches are clearly not U.S. troops. Therefore, the key question regarding whether the WPR can govern cyber operations is not whether the operation is conducted independently or as part of a kinetic military operation. Rather, the key question is the delivery mechanism. For example, if military forces were deployed to launch the cyberattack, such an activity, if it were related to imminent hostilities with a foreign country, could trigger the WPR. This seems unlikely, however, for two reasons. First, it is unclear whether small-scale deployments where the soldiers are not participating or under threat of harm constitute the introduction of armed forces into hostilities under the War Powers Resolution.
192 Thus, individual operators deployed to plant viruses in particular enemy systems may not constitute armed forces introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities. Second, such a tactical approach seems unlikely. If the target system is remote access, the military can attack it without placing personnel in harm's way.
193
If it is close access, there exist many other effective ways to target such systems. 194 As a result, unless U.S. troops are introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities while deploying offensive cyber capabilities-which is highly unlikely-such operations will not trigger the War Powers Resolution.
IV. THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT: COVERT ACTIONS AND THE TRADITIONAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES EXEMPTION
Stemming from similar tension noted in the constitutional division of war-making authority noted above, congressional oversight of covert actions beyond intelligence collection has often proved a point of contention between the executive and legislative branches. 195 Presidents have "inferred authority [to conduct covert actions] from such places as the Vesting Clause, the Commander-in-Chief Clause, the Treaty Clause, and from an implied executive privilege." 
196
Id. at 517.
Likewise, Congress attempted to rein in the President's ability to conduct covert operations without oversight by implementing a series of laws that required the President to get approval before undertaking such activities.
197
If the President did not provide such notification, Congress could decline to fund that particular covert activity. 198 Following the revelation that widespread, unreported covert actions were undertaken during the Vietnam War, Congress moved for stricter control of executive power, both by forcing the executive to account for the money it was spending as part of annual authorization bills 199 and by streamlining its own oversight capability by tasking two primary committees, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, with oversight.
200
While Congress designed this legislation to rein in the President's power to conduct covert activities without oversight, events in the 1980s clearly showed that its efforts had been ineffective. 201 In particular, the Iran-Contra affair illustrated that Congress needed to substantially reform oversight legislation to ensure that it could properly monitor executive covert action. 202 As a result, in 1990, Congress began drafting a new oversight bill, The Act further provides that the President must ensure that any covert action that falls under the scope of the Act is reported to Congress "as soon as possible after such approval and before the initiation of the covert action"
205 unless "the President determines that it is essential to limit access to the finding to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States." 206 Moreover, if the President does not fully inform the intelligence committees prior to the action, he or she "shall fully inform the [congressional] intelligence committees in a timely fashion and shall provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice." 207 Congress, recognizing that the power of the statute turned-to a substantial degree-on the definition of covert action, provided guidance both in the legislation and the committee reports as to what the term meant. According to the statute, "the term 'covert action' means an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly."
208
Congress also provided a list of exceptions to the term, however, specifically noting that, inter alia, "activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the operational security of United States Government programs, or administrative activities," as well as "traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities," do not constitute covert action. 209 While an initial textual reading of these exceptions-especially traditional military activities ("TMAs")-suggests that they are extremely broad, an examination of the Act's legislative history suggests that they are narrower than they first appear. In particular, as University of Texas law professor Robert Chesney notes, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's ("SSCI") committee report associated with the legislation, went on to make clear that the SSCI assumed that U.S. government responsibility 'would be apparent or acknowledged at the time of the military operation.' When that was not the case-i.e. when "military elements not identifiable to the United States [are] used to carry out an operation abroad without ever being acknowledged by the United States"-the operation would not constitute TMA. 210 This original understanding led to an odd result, whereby "the TMA exemption did no work, as the definition of covert action already excluded operations in which the U.S. role was intended to be acknowledged." 211 To remedy this issue, the committees proposed, and President Bush ultimately accepted, 212 a compromise whereby an unacknowledged operation could fall under the traditional military activities exemption by meeting two requirements: 213 first, the TMA must be commanded and executed by military personnel; and second, the TMA must take place in a context in which overt hostilities are either ongoing or anticipated, meaning approval has been given by the National Command Authority (which consists of the President and the Secretary of Defense) for the activities and for the operational planning for hostilities.
214
A. The Intelligence Authorization Act as Applied to Offensive Cyber Operations
Given the language of the statute and the elaboration on its language provided by the legislative history, would offensive cyber operations-either used independently or in conjunction with a military campaign-trigger the notification requirements of the Intelligence Authorization Act? Looking first at cyber operations used prior to-or in conjunction with-military campaigns, the President would not need to report these to Congress under § 413b. Interestingly, depending on how the United States decides to conduct its offensive cyber operations, they may not even constitute covert actions under 413b, before even reaching the question of whether they fall under the exemptions. The statute's definition of covert actions requires that the United States not intend its role be "apparent or acknowledged publicly." 216 If, for example, the United States were to launch an attack using proxy forces-similar to the alleged Russian attack against Georgia in the 2008 war-it would likely constitute a covert action because the United States would be attempting to hide its role. Conversely, in the Israeli case, Israel likely did not intend for its computer attack against Syrian air defenses to remain hidden; indeed, by the overall attack's public nature, it seemed likely that information about the cyberattack preceding the military strike would be revealed. Likewise, if the United States in the lead-up to the Libya intervention had launched a cyberattack against the Libyan air defense network, it might also have failed to constitute covert action because of the likelihood that the third party observers would understand that a cyberattack occurred. Further, in the Israeli case and the Libya hypothetical, Israel and the United States clearly did not intend to hide their roles, as they followed the cyberattacks (or considered attacks) by openly striking targets within those countries.
If the United States did intend to hide a cyberattack, even though it was part of a larger military operation, such an attack would likely fall into the "traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities" exception provided in the statute.
217
To qualify as a traditional military activity, the TMA must be commanded and executed by military personnel and take place in a context in which overt hostilities are either ongoing or anticipated, meaning approval has been given by the National Command Authority for the activities and for the operational planning for hostilities.
218
Given that the National Security Agency, responsible for the development and deployment of U.S. cyber capabilities, is co-housed and 216 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) (2000).
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Id. extensively shares personnel with U.S. Cyber Command, the military command tasked with launching cyberattacks against adversaries, it seems likely that any such attack will satisfy the first prong of the test.
219
Regarding the second prong, cyber operations conducted prior to, or in conjunction with, military operations may also take place in a context in which overt hostilities are either ongoing or anticipated. First, using the Russian activities in the 2008 war with Georgia as the basis for a factual hypothetical, if the United States were to conduct similar operations parallel to kinetic operations, such activity would be taking place in the context of overt hostilities. Though the level of hostilities is important in determining whether "overt hostilities" exist, 220 a Georgian-style conflict would likely trigger this exception. 221 Though one might argue, as the Obama administration did in the 2011 Libyan intervention, that its actions did not constitute hostilities (and therefore did not trigger the War Powers Resolution's reporting requirement), that argument does not hold force here because the Obama Administration was referring to the period after United States airmen were engaging in direct strikes against Libyan ground forces (and after all of Libya's air defenses were effectively destroyed).
222 By inference, the period in which U.S. forces were striking Libyan targets did constitute hostilities.
Therefore, these cyber operations, used in conjunction with military operations, would likely fall under the TMA exception.
If the cyberattacks were used prior to the commencement of hostilities (for example if the United States launched OCOs to disable Libya's air defense network), they would also likely fall under the language of the exception because the National Command Authority would have given approval both for the activities and operational planning for the hostilities. While this might seem like a high burden, National Command Authority consists only of the President and the Secretary of Defense.
223
Thus the 219 Chesney, supra note 76, at 581 ("CYBERCOM and NSA are co-located at Fort Meade, they share some personnel (many of whom are trained in procedures meant to preserve a distinction between their actions as CYBERCOM personnel and their potentially-identical actions wearing their hats as NSA personnel), and both are (and must be) headed by the same official (currently General Keith Alexander).").
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See supra notes 219-22 and accompanying text. 
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Libya War Powers, supra note 14, at 7-9 ("The situation in Libya does not constitute a war requiring specific congressional approval under the Declaration of War Clause of the Constitution.").
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Dep't of Def., Directive Number 5100.30, § 3.1 (Dec. 2, 1971) ("The NCA consists only of the President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors.").
President and the Secretary of Defense must only approve the activities in anticipation of overt hostilities. Further, because operational planning can simply constitute planning for a "situation that likely would involve military forces in response to natural and man-made disasters, terrorists, subversives, military operations by foreign powers, or other situations as directed by the President or SecDef," 224 National Command Authority for operational planning does not require the President and the Secretary of Defense to prepare to commence overt hostilities, but rather they can simply conduct contingency planning for a wide range of scenarios. Further, in a circumstance where the United States is prepared to actively intervene in another country, such as Libya, it would be clear that overt hostilities are anticipated, even in circumstances where overt hostilities are not imminent. In such a scenario, the President is merely considering future action and planning accordingly, and thus such offensive cyber operations would likely fall under the Traditional Military Activities exception.
Offensive cyber operations might also be exempt under the routine support exception. If the activity is "routine support" to "traditional diplomatic or military activities," it does not constitute covert action.
225
Though the legislation does not define "routine," the Senate committee suggested it involved a subjective element and that providing pertinent examples might be useful. 226 According to the committee, the term "would include various forms of logistical support that might be useful in placing personnel inside a denied area and enabling them to act without detection, including false documents, communications gear, safe houses, transportation, and information." 227 Interestingly, these examples seem to reference support to covert activities, not necessarily traditional military activities (i.e. helping to facilitate individuals to act without detection). However, if these activities are meant to support traditional military activities, then the language seems likely to encompass cyberattacks in preparation for military attacks against a target. For example, if the United States had launched OCOs against Libya to disable its air defense network in preparation of an allied air attack, this might be similar to aiding personnel in gaining access to a denied area (in this case, the personnel would be U.S. aircraft and the associated crewmen and the denied area would be airspace denied because of the defenses protecting it). While ambiguity certainly exists as to whether such a cyber operation would constitute routine support, offensive cyber operations conducted prior to-or in conjunction withkinetic operations likely do fall under the covert action exemption.
Likewise, offensive cyber operations conducted independently of military operations, though likely constituting covert action, are also likely exempt under the Traditional Military Activities exception. Imagine, for example, that the United States launched the Stuxnet worm that attacked Iran's nuclear enrichment capabilities without Israeli involvement. Further imagine that all other facts in the case were the same as they are in reality (i.e. the United States denied its involvement in the attack). In such a case, the attack seems to constitute a covert action that requires reporting to the congressional intelligence committees because it was an activity to influence political conditions (i.e. the Iranian ability or decision to develop its nuclear program) or military conditions (i.e. preventing the Iranians from moving forward with the development of a nuclear weapon, which could substantially bolster their military capability) abroad. 228 Further, the United States did not intend for its role to be apparent or publicly acknowledged.
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Despite falling into this category, however, such an offensive operation, for the reasons discussed above, likely satisfies the congressional test for a traditional military activity. First, because General Alexander is the commander of both CYBERCOM and the head of the National Security Agency and because many of the personnel are dual-hatted at the respective organizations, any offensive cyber operation conducted independently of a kinetic assault will be commanded and executed by military personnel. 230 Second, because the President can launch offensive cyber operations without congressional notification if they are in anticipation of hostilities, 231 he also has great flexibility in deciding whether to report his activities. For example, if the President were to order the launch of a Stuxnet-style attack against Iran to degrade its nuclear enrichment capability, such an activity would-assuming it was done with the Secretary of Defense's consentnecessarily constitute approval by the National Command Authority. In addition, because the definition of operational planning-another element required in fulfilling the TMA exception to the definition of covert actionis so broad, such an attack would likely fall within its purview. The President would simply argue that approval has been given for operational planning of future combat operations with Iran (which it almost certainly has in the U.S. military) 232 As a result, it becomes evident that even a Stuxnet-type of attack likely will not trigger the requirements set forth in the Intelligence Authorization Act. Given the dual-hatted nature of many NSA and CYBERCOM personnel, as well as the fact that action approved by the President and the Secretary of Defense necessarily constitutes approval by the National Command Authority, all the executive branch must realistically show is that it undertook the operation in a context where operational planning had occurred for potential hostilities at some undefined point in the future. This hurdle is very low and the executive should have little problem clearing it.
These limited requirements suggest that the executive can easily argue that offensive cyber operations conducted both as independent actions and in conjunction with kinetic operations likely fall under the Traditional Military Activity exception to the definition of covert action as provided by the Intelligence Authorization Act. As a result, the President is likely not statutorily required to report any offensive cyberattacks under the Act.
V. A MIDDLE GROUND OF LEGAL OVERSIGHT
This analysis suggests that, given inherent weaknesses in the underlying statutory schemes, excluding offensive cyber operations from their scope does not substantially shift the balance of war-making authority between the President and Congress. This exclusion does, however, provide the President additional, powerful means by which to conduct military action without congressional oversight.
Based on analysis of the War Powers Resolution, the lack of oversight for OCOs does not radically shift the balance between the legislative and executive branches' war-making authority. Most notably, because the War Powers Resolution itself has proven ineffective in providing Congress with a powerful tool to govern presidential use of force, bringing OCOs under the War Powers Resolution's statutory umbrella likely would not provide the possibility of such oversight. However, insofar as the President has increasingly turned to covert action since the passage of the War Powers Resolution to avoid its reporting requirements, 233 The lack of congressional oversight of offensive cyber operations under the Intelligence Authorization Act also likely does not seriously shift the balance between congressional and executive war-making powers. The reason is inherent in the limitations of the legislation itself: the Intelligence Authorization Act specifies reporting requirements, but does not require the non-use or withdrawal of forces. 234 Further, these reports must be made in a "timely" fashion (the definition of which is undefined) and only to a small number of Congressmen (at most eight). 235 Thus even if the President had to report offensive cyber operations to Congress, it is unclear he would have to do so in a way that gave Congress an effective check, as these reports would be made only to a small group of Congressmen (who would not be able to share the information, because of its classified nature, with other members of the legislature) and could be done well after the employment of these capabilities. The resulting picture is one of increased presidential flexibility; the War Powers Resolution and the Intelligence Authorization Act-while arguably ineffective in many circumstances-provide increased congressional oversight of presidential war-making actions such as troop deployments and covert actions. Yet these statutes do not cover offensive cyber operations, giving the President an increasingly powerful foreign policy tool outside congressional reach.
Should these statutes be adjusted (or new ones created) that give Congress additional oversight in this area? Two competing desiderata suggest that oversight should be increased, but only to a limited extent. On the one hand, policymakers have suggested that developing strict rules and limitations on the use of offensive cyber operations will handicap the military's ability to quickly and effectively employ these tools in critical situations, such as cyber warfare against adversarial states.
236 According to these arguments, developing red lines that proscribe the use of these capabilities will create reluctance and trepidation among strategists and will lead to disadvantages in combat situations. 237 On the other hand, developing some legal rules is necessary to ensure that, as these cyber Executive to substitute covert for overt operations and to transfer control of those operations from the military establishment to the intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA"). 
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